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

John Carter Brown.

Nelson Rich

ent° p. 139.

See Solon 40527

A THIRD

LETTER

To the Right Honourable

The EARL of B***.

IN WHICH

The Cauſes and Conſequences of the War between Great Britain and Spain, are fully conſidered;

AND

The Conduct of a certain Right Honourable Gentleman further examined.

LONDON:

Printed for J. COOTE, at the King's Arms, in Pater-noſter-Row. MDCCLXII.

(Price One Shilling and Six-pence.)

JOHN CARTER BROWN.

A THIRD LETTER, &c.

MY LORD,

IT is with the utmoſt reluctance that I intrude upon your lordſhip with a new addreſs; but the happy operation of my two former letters upon the public, under the ſanction of your lordſhip's name, emboldens me to undertake a third. I am, my Lord, perhaps the only political writer in this kingdom that ever wrote with the profeſſed deſign of aboliſhing parties in politics. I had, ſome days ago, the infinite ſatisfaction of reflecting that parties were coaleſced, or upon the point of being ſo; but, unhappily, the only

event that ought moſt loudly to call for public unanimity has revived our animoſities. My Lord, was there not a ſingle man in his majeſty's dominions to ſecond me, I would ſpeak and publiſh my opinion, that there is a degree of popularity that may be dangerous to a free people; and that there may be ſuch a thing as an *accidental*, nay, an *unmerited* popularity; I ſay there may be, for I hope none ſuch exiſts in this country. But, my Lord, the writer of theſe lines is old enough to have ſeen ſuch a popularity exiſting, founded on falſe, fooliſh, and frivolous grounds. He has ſeen the people of England do every thing but adore, and ſcarcely abſtaining even from adoring the advocates for a Spaniſh war. He muſt, at the ſame time, do them the juſtice to ſay, that they recovered from their phrenzy, and that they as heartily deſpiſed, as they had before madly idolized, thoſe *patriots*, as it was then faſhionable to call every man who had not coolneſs

enough

enough to think for himſelf or to feel for the public.

I remember, my Lord, the time when a certain admiral was, if poſſible, more popular than a late miniſter; but he lived to be deſpiſed, and even his own friends bluſhed at their miſtaken partiality in his favour. At that time, this admiral might have raiſed a rebellion; and the diviſions that happened on his account in the cabinet, in the parliament, and all over the nation, effected very little leſs than a rebellion; nor ſhall I at all decline ſaying, that, at laſt, they virtually produced one; becauſe nothing is more certain than that the enemies of this happy conſtitution were encouraged to take arms in the year 1745, from the opinion they had of our diviſions.

In ſhort, my Lord, amongſt a free, a brave, and a generous people, ſuch as the Engliſh are, popularity may be acquired upon very eaſy terms; and the right honourable gentleman, who is now the idol

of the people, has perhaps the cheapeſt bargain of it that any Engliſhman ever had; and has obtained it in the moſt unaccountable manner. The *vir juſtus et tenax propoſiti*; that is, the man who proceeds on the principles he ſet out with in life, who is as unmoved by proſperous, as he is undaunted by adverſe, circumſtances, uſed to be the venerable character with a free people. The popularity of a man who ſhifts his practice and principles according to events, is a phænomenon reſerved for theſe times.

A man virtuouſly popular, my Lord, will diſclaim all imputed merit, and all influence that ariſes merely from miſtaken opinion. A true patriot will be glad of every opportunity to undeceive his countrymen in their abſurdities; becauſe, however well intentioned he may be, and however well placed their confidence in him is, they may from miſtaken motives, place the ſame confidence in an unworthy object. The right honourable

gentleman,

gentleman, therefore, and his friends, if they really are patriots, never can take amiſs any attempt that is made to ſet the public right, as to the merits of his popularity; and if he is poſſeſſed of any, merely by imputation, he will reſign it as willingly as he would an inheritance to which he has no title either in law or conſcience.

Surmiſes, my Lord, ſtrengthened by a late paragraph in our Gazette, indicating the abrupt departure of our miniſter from the court of Madrid, has revived the popular cry of a certain right honourable gentleman's political infallibility. All his friends are now up in arms, ſheltered under the approaching war, and are hurling their defiances againſt all who ever dared to queſtion his conduct. I happen to be ſingular enough, to think his conduct to be quite out of the queſtion, whether we have or have not a Spaniſh war. It is true, if the letter publiſhed in his name is really his, he has told us that his poli-

tical

tical abdication was owing to a difference of ſentiments with the reſt of the king's ſervants, with regard to what Spain had done to our prejudice.

Your lordſhip is ſenſible, that there was not a ſervant the king had, who differed with the right honourable gentleman, as to the facts he urged at the C—l B—d: nay, I will venture to ſay that ſome who were there, and who were the keeneſt in oppoſing him, had as bad an opinion, as he had, of the deſigns of Spain; but, my Lord, a king of Great-Britain cannot proceed like a king of France or Pruſſia, upon ſelf-conviction merely. He cannot ſay, "I am ſatisfied, I have provocation, and therefore I will go to war." His majeſty has proceeded as a king of England ought to do, by leaving nothing undone that can create in the breaſts of neighbouring people and princes, or what is ſtill more material in thoſe of his own ſubjects, the leaſt doubt as to the propriety of his own

conduct,

conduct, and the injuſtice of that of Spain.

The moſt clamorous of the right honourable gentleman's friends cannot, therefore, impute to him the ſmalleſt merit of his having foreſeen or foretold what had eſcaped the obſervation of others. There was no debate as to facts: the only queſtion was, Are we to proceed like lawleſs ruffians, or in a regular manner? "It is poſſible, ſaid the right honourable gentleman's opponents, that Spain may have done ſo or ſo; and it is but too probable, that ſhe has in her head ill deſigns againſt this nation; but have they been ſufficiently manifeſted to juſtify our hurrying all at once into hoſtilities?" This, my Lord, when we conſider the temper, the ſtate, and the ſituation of this nation, at that time, was no unreaſonable ſuggeſtion, nor do I believe there was any member who ſat at the C——l B——d, who did not more than ſuſpect what has ſince

happened

happened with regard to Spain, and who did not expect that a war muſt be the conſequence ſooner or later. In the firſt letter I had the honour to addreſs to your lordſhip, far from entering into the truth or falſhood of allegations, I took the liberty to ſay, that the people of England thought a Spaniſh war was too good news to be true. The people of England, my Lord, wiſhed for a Spaniſh war, and it was to them the moſt deſirable event that could have happened: but, my Lord, I wiſh it had happened two years ago, if our grievances are of that ſtanding; for I muſt be of opinion, that we ſhall enter upon a Spaniſh war, now, under greater diſadvantages than could have attended any period for theſe fifty years paſt; and, my Lord, I own I muſt be ſo unfaſhionable as to think that if ſuch a war could have been avoided with any tolerable degree of decency or dignity on our parts, it ought to have been avoided.

It is not, my Lord, for a private man

or writer, to call upon the right honourable gentleman for his reaſons, why, if he was furniſhed with the proper documents, that rendered a Spaniſh war inevitable, he ſhould have outſate the only time, when we could have entered upon it with ſucceſs. Did the right honourable gentleman, before he reſigned the ſeals of his office, ſay to his maſter, or the reſt of the miniſtry, "You are injured by Spain; you muſt come to an ecclairciſſement, and if ſhe ſhall refuſe to give you a categorical anſwer, you ought to declare war."

I cannot, my Lord, help thinking, that this would have been a proceeding far more deſerving the name of patriotic, than that which the right honourable gentleman has obſerved. He catched the advantage of the very nick of time, when forms interfered with ſubſtance; and he was for arreſting the Spaniſh ſhips, before we had made an affidavit, or taken out a writ. Far be it, my Lord,

from me to queſtion the right honourable gentleman's integrity; but, upon my word, I cannot but think it extremely odd, that he did not ſuggeſt to his majeſty and the miniſtry, the reaſons why they ought to enter into a Spaniſh war, before their flota and galleons arrived in Old Spain. There is not a man ſo poorly converſant in hiſtory, as to be ignorant that the arrival of their galleons and flota is the criſis of all their deliberations; and that for ſeventy years paſt, the Spaniards, before that arrival, were always humble, and after it, inſolent. Now, my Lord, let us join iſſue with the right honourable gentleman's popularity. Was he not furniſhed with every fact twelve months ago that he is in poſſeſſion of at preſent, that could juſtify our going to war with Spain; but did he ever before the tenth of September laſt, give an intimation that ſuch a war was inevitable, or did he, before the eighth or tenth of the following month,

month, ever in public or in private, declare, that the oppoſition he met with on that account was the cauſe of his reſolution to reſign the ſeals of his office.

It is, my Lord, impoſſible to look into thoughts, but common ſenſe muſt teach any man, that the right honourable gentleman had no more reaſon for reſigning on the fifth of October laſt, than he had on the fifth of October preceding. Forms amongſt nations are deemed to be eſſential. A word and a blow, it is true, has the vogue amongſt us bold Britons; but we may find it difficult to make other nations adopt the ſame laconic method. Had the right honourable gentleman, even twelve months before he reſigned the ſeals of his office, declared his reſolution not to keep them, unleſs we went to war with Spain, we could not at that very time have entered into war, but we muſt have proceeded in the manner we have done.

This

This nation, however, muſt have been greatly benefited by gaining a few months. After forms were over, hoſtilities might have commenced, and the capture of the flota or the galleons, might have enabled us to pay part of the unjuſt reckoning our enemies have charged us with. The caſe, however, was far different. The only perſon who was poſitive the Spaniſh war was inevitable, ſtood aloof. He dallied till we ſlipped the opportunity; nor did he once declare himſelf on the ſubject, till the Spaniards got home their treaſures, and became in a condition to bid us defiance.

What has been the conſequence? Every art of popularity, and various are the arts employed to ſupport it, has been employed with the giddy vulgar, to make them believe that the right honourable gentleman's preſcience and omniſcience has been treated with undeſerved neglect; and every throat is now open to tell us, that he foreſaw more than all the nation beſides

beſides did. The meaning of all this is, that England muſt be ruined if the right honourable gentleman does not reſume the ſeals with as great a plenitude of power, as he ſhall pleaſe to carve out for himſelf. My Lord, I cannot help being of opinion, that they who have had the honour of conducting the affairs of the miniſtry, ſince the right honourable gentleman retired from them, have done the very thing that he would have done, or ought to have done, had he continued in poſt. They have loſt no time in demanding that categorical anſwer, which he ought to have demanded, but did not, three years ago. My Lord, I muſt look upon thoſe three years as ſo much miſpent time to Great Britain; becauſe, if we are now to enter into a war with Spain, we do it with the diſadvantage of their being ten millions richer, and we forty millions poorer than either of us would have been three years ago. But, my Lord, I am afraid a ſtill worſe conſequence follows,

and

and that the credit of our arms, and even of this nation, was much higher two years ago than it is at preſent. The right honourable gentleman and his friends can beſt account for the cauſes of this reverſe; and if it was brought upon us by their conduct, they ſhewed themſelves the moſt able of all politicians, in clapping the collar of their own manufacturing upon the ſhoulders of others. A little review of our preſent ſituation muſt convince us of their wiſdom, in providing for their own ſafety at the expence of that of the nation.

Suppoſing, my Lord, the right honourable gentleman and his friends to be at this very time in poſſeſſion of the power they held ſome months ago, and that ſome honeſt well meaning Engliſh gentleman ſhould unfortunately aſk them, "Where are the allies of Great Britain; where has ſhe a friend to her back?" I remember, my Lord, the time when a miniſter not being able to anſwer that queſtion, was thought

thought a ſufficient foundation of a motion, for removing him from his majeſty's preſence and councils for ever. That miniſter, my Lord, did not pride himſelf upon the conqueſts he had planned; and the eternal objection to his adminiſtration was, that during it we were ſixty-five, or ſixty-ſix millions in debt. The public debt is now double that ſum; and, as matters go on, we muſt triple it. Now, my Lord, let me ſit down with a reader equally cool as candid, and examine whether the public of Great Britain has received an equivalent for ſuch an immenſe addition to her national debt. But to do this cooly and diſpaſſionately, it is neceſſary for me to ſuppoſe this nation to be in that ſtate which the right honourable gentleman's conduct removed out of our ſight, when he rejected the terms that were offered by France. Let us then compare that ſtate with our preſent, deeply involved as we are in a war with one great power, on the eve of one with another, and dreaded or hated by all Europe.

I ſhall, not for this purpoſe, have any retroſpect to any part of the right honourable gentleman's conduct, as a miniſter, that made a war, the only expedient we could purſue to vindicate our national honour. I ſhall confine myſelf to the period between this and November 25, 1759, when the duke of Brunſwick tranſmitted from the Hague to the miniſters of France, Vienna, and Ruſſia, their Britannic and Pruſſian majeſties pacific declaration, and which was printed in the London Gazette, of the 4th of December the ſame year. It is remarkable, my Lord, that at this time, Great Britain may be ſaid to have been in the zenith of her glory. She had conquered Canada; ſhe had deſtroyed the French marine; and ſome months before, the bonfires for one victory were ſcarcely expiring, when others for other victories were lighted up. Notwithſtanding this flattering proſpect, every breaſt that entertained ſentiments of humanity, was pleaſed to obſerve his late majeſty's moderation, when he declared

clared "he was touched with compaſſion at the miſeries of the war which had been kindled in Europe; and that he ſhould think himſelf wanting to the duties of humanity, and regardleſs of the intereſt he took in the preſervation and welfare of his kingdoms and ſubjects, if he neglected to uſe proper meaſures towards checking the progreſs of that cruel peſtilence, and not contribute towards the re-eſtabliſhment of public tranquility." Sentiments worthy of the father of a people, and the guardian of the rights of mankind. What pity was it that the power which was joint guarantee with France, of the treaty of Weſtphalia, and which was capitally concerned in the peace of Germany, I mean Sweden, was not ſo much as mentioned in this declaration; and if the public is not greatly miſinformed no copy of it was regularly tranſmitted either by our court, or by the duke of Brunſwick, the mediating agent, to the Swediſh miniſtry. This omiſſion

was connected with one of a ſtill groſſer kind, which was the neglecting to mention the king of Poland, who had been the greateſt ſufferer by the war, and upon whoſe account it may be ſaid to have been lighted up in Germany. I own, my Lord, that I never could have a ſatisfactory reaſon for either of thoſe omiſſions. Sweden had juſt as good a right to be conſulted in every thing relating to Germany as France had, as ſhe does not pretend to have any concern there, but as guarantee of the treaty of Weſtphalia. Her injuſtice, it is true, drove her to attack the late king's Hanoverian dominions, on account of her quarrel with England; but even that attack was coloured by the guaranteeſhip, to which, as ſhe pretended, ſhe ſtood bound; a plea that gives her no better title, than Sweden has, for being a principal in the German war.

With regard to his Poliſh majeſty; let us pay all due honour to the humanity,

courage,

courage, and other ſtriking qualities, of our great, and indeed, only ally; yet ſtill we cannot help bewailing his fate, and owning it to be hard, if not unmerited. There was a time, without detracting from the merits of any houſe, when the head of the houſe of Saxony was the moſt reſpectable ſound that could ſalute the ear of a Proteſtant; and even at this his time, his ſubjects form as conſiderable a part of the proteſtant intereſt in German, as perhaps thoſe of his Pruſſian majeſty himſelf. I ſhall not pretend to vindicate the conduct either of the preſent king of Poland or his father, in their fallings off from Proteſtantiſm; but I muſt be of opinion, that their apoſtacy did not deprive them of the rights and conſideration due to his preſent Poliſh majeſty as a crowned head. For my own part, I never could hear that the proteſtant part of his Poliſh majeſty's Saxon ſubjects, ever were perſecuted on account of their religion; that they are, to this day, convinced, as to the

juſtice of the Pruſſian irruption; or that his Pruſſian majeſty has made them ſenſible of the difference between a Proteſtant and a Popiſh yoke. But, my Lord, be that as it will, I cannot help thinking that there never has been a good reaſon, or, indeed, any at all, urged for the ſignal diſreſpect we then manifeſted to thoſe two powers; nor can I ſee what ground we had to imagine, that the courts of Verſailles, of Vienna, and Peterſburg, would treat with us, excluſive of their two principal allies.

At the time the declaration in queſtion was made, France was ſtunned by the repeated blows ſhe ſhad received. The delay which attended her conſulting her allies, recovered her from her conſternation; but what is moſt important of all to obſerve is, that at the time when this pacific declaration was emitted, our treaty with Pruſſia was within thirteen days of expiring. The ſame being dated December 7, 1758.

It

It is, my Lord, evident to every one who has ever heard of our late negotiation with France, that the obſtacle, which overthrew it, was our engagements with Pruſſia. The original wiſdom of thoſe engagements has, I think, never yet been attempted to be vindicated; but it was ſpecious to ſay that the honour of the crown and nation was engaged in performing them after they had been incurred. My Lord, it was againſt common ſenſe to imagine, that on the 25th of November, 1759, his Pruſſian majeſty would give us leave (I am ſorry I am obliged to uſe that expreſſion) to recede from our engagements. We were married to him; but our marriage was not for life; for which we ought to have been thankful. If our great miniſter was ſo paſſionately deſirous of peace, as is expreſſed in the declaration, why, in the name of heaven, were we debarred from that bleſſing, by renewing a treaty which he knows muſt prove an eternal and an invincible bar to it?

it? Let us, as the vulgar ſaying has it, give the devil his due. France, undoubtedly, was in the right, when in a counter-declaration, ſhe affirmed " That the war between her and England had no object in common with that which had likewiſe for ſome years been carried on by the two empreſſes, with their allies, againſt the king of Pruſſia." This, my Lord, is an aſſertion, ſo plain, clear, and indubitable, that, conſidering the ſtake for which England was playing, future ages will be aſtoniſhed at our miniſter not availing himſelf of the conceſſion. As a maritime power detached from the continent, could any thing have preſented itſelf more favourable to us, than an opportunity of treating on a detached footing, which the delay of no more than thirteen days would have brought about. A delay, my Lord, ſhort of that which was required for the court of Verſailles conſulting her allies.

What conſtruction then muſt all Eu-

rope

rope make of our proceedings? At the very moment we are throwing out the moſt fervent ejaculations for peace, we are forming connections for the continuance of war. Could the right honourable gentleman imagine, that his Pruſſian majeſty would conſent to throw up 670,000 l. a year, which is ſix times more than all the dominions, he is *now* poſſeſſed of, bring him in; and, at the ſame time, forfeit the benefit of a powerful diverſion in his favour? But what muſt have been the conſequence, had thoſe ruinous thirteen days expired without the article of mutuality being renewed, or, more properly ſpeaking, if it never had been renewed? This is a natural, and ſeems to be a fair, queſtion; and, I am ſorry to ſay it, that I am afraid the rationability of it being ſo obvious, is the reaſon why it has been overlooked even by thoſe who are the warmeſt oppoſers of continental connections.

Before this point, my Lord, can be diſcuſſed

diſcuſſed, it is abſolutely neceſſary to attend a little to a threefold diſtinction; I mean, what this nation is bound to by poſitive engagements; what ſhe is bound to by the principles of publicfaith and honour; and what ſhe ought to follow upon thoſe of prudence and reaſonable foreſight. In this diſcuſſion, I ſhall very readily admit, that after we were bound to the king of Pruſſia, by poſitive engagements, thoſe engagements ought to have been fulfilled; and that we did plenarily and accumulatively fulfil them, is moſt certain. His Pruſſian majeſty, by the letter he wrote to the late king, gave us an early ſpecimen that he was determined to hold us to our engagements. He told that venerable monarch, in plain terms, that France, as well as England, had bid for him; that he had been gained by the higheſt bidder; and that he expected the conditions of the auction would be fulfilled. I am not, perhaps my Lord, to ſupport the authority of that letter,

which, I am told, was diſclaimed by his Pruſſian majeſty's order, but I believe all England, and all Europe are convinced, that it was authentic ; nor do I remember that the right honourable gentleman, whoſe buſineſs it certainly was to diſclaim it, if it was not authentic, ever received his late majeſty's commands for ſo doing. It is certain, that France did publiſh it as being authentic ; and it is as certain, that the dignity of the right honourable gentleman's office could not have been tarniſhed, had he ſignified to the public, by the king his maſter's orders, that no ſuch letter ever was received. I muſt, therefore, my Lord, ſuppoſe, though I will not affirm, that ſuch a letter once had an exiſtence. The conſequence of this ſuppoſition is, that there was a time when his late majeſty thought that the intereſt of his electoral, as well as regal, dominions required his withdrawing from a German war ; but that the tribunitial power of the Veto,

which his Pruſſian majeſty had acquired by treaty, prevented him. Pray, my Lord, could a Britiſh miniſter have a ſtronger ſpecimen, that it was our great ally's determined reſolution, to maintain his claim of our having taken him for better and worſe; at leaſt, while the term of the treaty ſubſiſted? It is true, this nation, at that time, was next to intoxicated with our Pruſſian alliance; but, my Lord, I am ſingular enough to think that the judgment of a great miniſter ought not to be borne down by a popular current, however ſtrong it may run. A few minutes of cool reflection muſt have made him ſenſible, that his Britannic majeſty's views, and thoſe of his Pruſſian majeſty, were incompatible, and he ought to have felicitated himſelf upon the near proſpect he had of rendering them entirely independent of one another. Inſtead of that, engagement was heaped upon engagement, and one treaty tacked to another, till onr intereſt became inextricable;

tricable; and the convulſions of our ally catched ſuch hold of us in his agonizing moments, that it appears as if we muſt now ſwim or ſink together. Can it be ſaid that this implication, this intricacy, of concerns with a power, that, to all eternity, never can ſerve Great-Britain in the moſt minute intereſt ſhe has, has been effected by a firm patriot and a Britiſh conduct? Let us figure to ourſelves the worſt proſpect we can figure, and that after the convention at Haſtenbeck, Great Britain had ſhook herſelf looſe of all continental connections; would ſhe in ſuch a caſe, have poſſeſſed a ſingle foot of territory leſs than ſhe does now? Yes, ſays the right honourable gentleman and his friends, Quebec and Guadaloupe were conquered in Germany. My Lord, the ſuffering ſuch a paradox to eſcape uncenſured, is perhaps the greateſt evidence that any miniſter ever brought of his triumph over the underſtanding of the people of Great Britain.

On the 26th of June, 1759, the whole embarkation deſtined againſt Quebec arrived at the iſle of Orleans. The French, about that time, had placed their whole reſource for the recovery of their affairs upon an invaſion of Great-Britain, which did not ſuffer them to ſpare a ſingle ſhip to the aſſiſtance of their American colonies. They had likewiſe, at that very time, ſuch a ſuperiority of force in Germany, that it was every day expected the Britiſh army under prince Ferdinand muſt ſurrender priſoners at diſcretion; and nothing but the miraculous event of the battle of Minden could have prevented their doing ſo. There was but the ſpace of thirty-five days between that battle and the landing of our troops on the iſle of Orleans. The proſpect we then had of ſucceſs, as appears by general Wolfe's letter, was next to none, perhaps leſs than none; and the French had above 10,000 regular troops in Canada, commanded by two able generals to diſappoint all our attempts there.

It

It happened, how unaccountably I ſhall not ſay, that the army which effected that conqueſt did not exceed 9000 men. Now, my Lord, let us conſider what muſt have been the conſequence, if neither the French nor we had had a ſingle battalion in Germany, at the time when we had 25,000 of our beſt troops in that country. The French, conſidering the vaſt ſuperiority they had over us in Canada, never could have dreamed of ſending reinforcements thither; eſpecially when they knew the abſolute impoſſibility of ſuch reinforcements arriving there while we were in full poſſeſſion of the navigation of the river of St. Laurence. Nothing can illuſtrate what I here ſay, better than the unexceptionable authority of general Wolfe himſelf, who, in the placart he publiſhed as commander in chief of the troops of his Britannic majeſty on his arrival in the river St. Laurence, in the month of Auguſt, 1759, has the following remarkable paragraph: "The Canadians,

dians, ſays he, cannot be ignorant of their ſituation. The Engliſh are maſters of the river, and blocking up the paſſages to all ſuccours from Europe. They have, beſides, a powerful army on the continent, under the command of general Amherſt."

From this pregnant quotation, my Lord, it is extremely plain, that while Mr. Saunders had poſſeſſion of the river St. Laurence, as the French well knew he had, the ſending to Quebec the whole 130,000 men, which they were ſuppoſed then to employ in Germany, could have brought no manner of relief to that place; nor indeed is it poſſible for one to ſuggeſt to himſelf, as things were then circumſtanced, even the ſhadow of an argument, to prove that there ſubſiſted the moſt diſtant connection between our German and our American war.

But to deprive the advocates for war, of all ſubterfuge from that trite, tho' I am ſorry to ſay it, too prevailing an argu-

ment, as if our maintaining an army in Germany had given us Quebec; let me purſue the other part of the argument I have laid down, which was, (and it is allowing more than ever I heard demanded) that had the ſeas even been open to France, ſhe had no manner of occaſion to ſend more troops to Canada than ſhe already had there. In Mr. Wolfe's letter, dated from his head-quarters at Montmorenci, in the river St. Laurence, September 2, 1759; he very plainly, and very truly, informs the right honourable gentleman, "that the enemy was not only ſuperior to him in numbers, but that the marquis de Moncalm, the French general, *wiſely* depended on the natural ſtrength of the country." He then proceeds in the diſpatch as follows: "When, ſays he, I learned that ſuccours of all kinds had been thrown into Quebec; that five battallions of regular troops, completed from the beſt inhabitants of the country, ſome of the troops of the colony, and every Canadian

nadian that was able to bear arms, beſides ſeveral nations of ſavages, had taken the field in a very advantageous ſituation; I could not flatter myſelf that I ſhould be able to reduce the place." The remaining part of this diſpach, tho' written by as brave and as judicious a commander as England ever perhaps produced, breathes nothing but deſpondency. "By the liſt, ſays he, of diſabled officers, (many of whom are of rank) you may perceive, Sir, that the army is much weakened. By the nature of the river, the moſt formidable part of this armament is deprived of the power of acting; yet we have almoſt the whole force of Canada to oppoſe. In this ſituation, there is ſuch a choice of difficulties, that I own myſelf at a loſs how to determine. The affairs of Great Britain, I know, require the moſt vigorous meaſures; but then the courage of a handful of brave men ſhould be exerted only where there is ſome hope of a favourable event."

Now,

Now, my Lord, if general Wolfe did not impoſe upon the right honourable gentleman by this intelligence, what had France to apprehend for the ſafety of Quebec, when general Wolfe arrived in the river of St. Laurence? It is plain, from his own words, that while he lay there, he was to be conſidered as a beſieger, and the French as the beſieged, even before our army faced the walls of Quebec. It is true, the ſpirit and the intrepidity of the Britiſh troops conquered the natural ſtrength of the country; but it is true, that that conqueſt neither had nor could have the ſmalleſt operation upon the conduct of the French in Europe. It was what they no more expected than they did to be beaten at Minden. Their own public papers proclaimed to all Europe, that they were quite ſafe with regard to Quebec; and, indeed, to all human appearance, they well might be ſo; and our conqueſt was owing to a miraculous providence, that

may not again happen in a thouſand years; and which the French never could think of guarding againſt.

But, my Lord, I believe that the futility of the argument of our having conquered Quebec in Germany admits almoſt of a demonſtration, a degree of evidence that ſeldom happens in political controverſies. Had the French foreſeen their danger; had they apprehended our ſucceſs, it was not in their power to have ſent troops to the relief of Canada, and that for a very plain reaſon; becauſe Canada actually could not ſubſiſt her own inhabitants. It is notorious, that the humanity and generoſity of the Britiſh general and officers prevented the Canadians, who ſurrendered themſelves to our ſubjection, from ſtarving. If the right honourable gentleman or his friends ſhould pretend that France might have ſent the means of ſubſiſtence along with the troops deſtined for the relief of Canada, the anſwer is plain, that the thing itſelf

was

was impoſſible; or admitting it to be poſſible, they could not have carried with them proviſions for above a fortnight. Upon the whole, therefore, there is not perhaps in all hiſtory, a propoſition more certain than that our ſucceſs in Canada muſt have been the ſame as it was, tho' we had not had a company of foot in Germany.

This being the caſe, my Lord, what apology can the conduct of the right honourable gentleman admit of? Far from diſowning the fact of having involved us in a German war, which has coſt us twenty millions, he glories in it, and has ſaid, in defence of his notorious apoſtacy from anti-continental meaſures, that Canada was conquered in Germany. Lamentable muſt the ſtate of a people's underſtanding be, who can be brought to ſwallow ſuch abſurdities. Did our having an army of 25,000 men in Germany favour Sir William Johnſon's ſucceſs againſt Niagara? did it force the French

to abandon Crown Point and Ticonderago? did it level the heights of the river Montmorenci, or bring the Canadians to ſubmit to our government? No, my Lord, thoſe events had not the moſt remote connection with German operations; and if the right honourable gentleman and his friends deſerve praiſe, it is for putting his defence upon an intelligible, though eaſily confuted, principle.

We forget, however, all this time, that we either are, or ſoon ſhall be, if we proceed as we do, about a *hundred and thirty millions in debt*,; that the intereſt of this debt muſt be paid by the public; that the public cannot pay it but out of the produce of popular induſtry; and that the right honourable gentleman's meaſures have cut off the right hand of that induſtry, by employing almoſt every fourth able bodied man in the kingdom in war, either by ſea or land. It may be a ſecret to your lordſhip, and I believe it is ſo to moſt of his majeſty's ſervants in high ſtations,

tions, but it is a moſt melancholy truth, that a middling labouring man at preſent, (and by ſuch our manufactories are all carried on) has no trade to purſue equally profitable as that of war. What ſtill makes this truth the more deplorable is, that the profeſſion of a ſoldier, at leaſt a ſoldier ſerving in England, is attended with much leſs fatigue than that of any manufacturer. A ſoldier, for I look upon our militia in no other light than as regular troops, when he enliſts for three years, which is 1095 days, receives ten guineas, which anſwers to 802 three-pences and one half-penny. Add this to a ſoldier's regular pay, together with what he may get by odd jobs, &c. not forgetting the care which the public is obliged to take of his wife and family; and what life of a common labouring manufacturer is to be compared to his, in the points either of profit or eaſe? My lord, I know none; and there is not a truth more alarming to a Britiſh miniſtry,

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(I mean an honeſt one) that every encouragement you give to your army ſubſtracts ſo much from the intereſt of your ſtate.

Unfortunately does it happen, that this is a time thoſe truths are ridiculed as unſeaſonable. There is ſcarcely a family now in Great Britain, be its conſideration what it will, from the palace to the cottage, that has not a relation either in the army or the navy. No topic, therefore, is ſo general as the praiſes of our brave ſoldiers and our brave ſailors. Every Britiſh ſubject almoſt is intereſted in them: but, my lord, was it thus that Britain roſe to renown, to dignity, to importance? No, the ſilent advances of her trade were made when the character of her arms and power was the leaſt conſpicuous. We were infatuated enough to rail almoſt for twenty years againſt a miniſter, (I mean Sir Robert Walpole) who kept on foot an army of not ſo many as 19,000 men. There is not a man of ſenſe

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in England at this time, who recollects the anniverſary debates on that head, who does not laugh at the nonſenſe of the arguments uſed againſt the keeping up that army as being dangerous to our liberties; but, my lord, we have not heard a ſingle whiſper of that danger, ſince above ten times that number of Britons have been employed in the purpoſes of war. To what can this be owing? Had that danger an exiſtence? No. Then what merit can they pretend to, who declaim themſelves into poſts and powers upon an empty ſhadow, and yet have introduced into the conſtitution a real ſubſtance of that very danger? The argument againſt a ſtanding-army, I am ſorry to ſay it, is more antiquated than it is unjuſt. The preamble to the mutiny-bill expreſſes a ſtanding-army to be inconſiſtent with the liberties of this country. What was the argument the right honourable gentleman and his friends built upon this? If a ſtanding-army, ſaid they, is (as it certainly

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is) dangerous to liberty, let us have a militia.

This lure of a militia was hung out, or toſs'd about, for ſeveral years, and the public adopted it with the utmoſt raptures. Little, however, did they know what it meant; and that the whole boaſted patriot's ſcheme of militia, in contradiſtinction to a ſtanding-army, muſt end in rendering that militia, to all intents and purpoſes, a ſtanding-army ſubject to that very military command which the right honourable gentleman and his friends had, for almoſt twenty years, exclaimed againſt; and I may defy any man alive to define *it*, excepting the duration of ſervice (and even in that there is ſome ambiguity)—what the difference is between a ſtanding-army and our preſent militia. Both are equally ſubject to that military law, which the right honourable gentleman and his friends ſo often condemned, as being inconſiſtent with the liberties of this nation.

Having

Having ſaid thus much, my Lord, I think myſelf obliged to clear myſelf from all imputation of being an enemy to a militia, or even to a ſtanding-army; becauſe I ſincerely think that the officers and leaders of neither can ever be brought into any ſchemes that are deſtructive to the country. All I mean to ſhew is, that the public ought to lay no manner of dependence upon the hackneyed topics of oppoſition; and that even the right honourable gentleman himſelf and his friends now laugh at the credulity of the public, in believing a ſingle word of thoſe profeſſions they made uſe of to raiſe themſelves into power.

But I ſhall now deſiſt from combating a phantom, for ſuch was their public ſpirit, and proceed to realities. The next period of our late negotiation was, when the French king had conquered the unaccountable omiſſion of two principals in the war againſt the king of Pruſſia, and had brought his allies to conſent to the

negotiation going forward. My Lord, I am far from being an advocate for the ſincerity of the French court; but I cannot help thinking that it is moſt ſincerely well diſpoſed in favour of its own intereſts; and that, at the period I now treat of, viz. the 26th of March, 1761, the intereſts of both nations were the ſame. France had loſt ſo much by the war that ſhe wanted to conclude it, and we had gained ſo much by it that we ought to have done the ſame. Matters appeared in another light to our miniſter; and his conduct was ſuch as demonſtrated that h thought the intereſt of Great Britain was placed, not upon a commercial or civil, but on a military foundation. The boaſts of France, of having conquered the iſland of Minorca, of being in poſſeſſion of Hanau and the landgraviate of Heſſe, with the town of Gottingen, were not only ridiculous, but plain demonſtrations of her impotence. Some allowances, however, ought to have been made to her deſire of

maintaining

maintaining her importance, as a capital ſtate in Europe. My Lord, I can ſee no manner of impropriety in indulging her with a little tinſel, provided we could ſecure to ourſelves that which, of all things, ought to be conſidered as moſt precious to a trading people, a ſafe and an honourable peace. But it ſeems even that gewgaw tinſel muſt be ript off. Our miniſter, conſcious of his inſignificancy, ſhould he mingle with the dregs of the people, that is, with thoſe who reaſon cooly and ſoberly on the advantages of peace to a trading nation, catched at every circumſtance to break off the negotiation.

I ſhall, my Lord, admit that France was unreaſonable in inſiſting as ſhe did, upon rendering the empreſs-queen the miſtreſs of Weſel and Gueldres; but was her obſtinacy in this reſpect to be put in competition with the bleſſings which peace muſt have brought to this nation, and the quiet poſſeſſion of all, I may ſay, that we have *really* gained in this war. Was

the right honourable gentleman to employ all the declamatory power he is poſſeſſed of, in blazoning out his impropriety of ſubmitting to ſuch terms, the whole could not amount to the hundredth part of the expence we have been at in rejecting them.

I ſhall now, my Lord, take the liberty to proceed to a third period of the treaty in queſtion: but I muſt beg leave to lay out of it all mention of epochs and *uti poſſideatis*; terms which both our miniſter and that of France knew extremely well ſignified nothing; and which they made uſe of only to amuſe or puzzle the underſtandings of the people whom they wanted to guide. On the 19th of April, 1761, the French king intimates that his Britannic majeſty (and I dare to ſay there was ſome foundation for his intelligence) agreed that the nature of the objects which had occaſioned the war between France and England was totally foreign from the diſputes which had given riſe

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to the war in Germany. Now, my Lord, if his Britannic majeſty was candid enough to admit of that ſimple, that undeniable, propoſition, where, in the name of common ſenſe, was the juſtice or propriety of admitting a ſingle German confideration into the negociation? We did not connect ourſelves with Pruſſia on account of our American concerns; they had not the ſmalleſt regard to the ballance of power in Germany. Had Great Brittain taken France at her word, and ſaid to her, Let us put the conſideration of the German war out of the queſtion, and ſettle our American affairs, where could have been the harm of ſuch a proceeding to us; unleſs the ſaving twenty millions of money is to be reckoned amongſt our misfortunrs? But, ſays the right honourable gentleman's friends, it would be diſhonourable in us to deſert our ally, his Pruſſian majeſty. To this I anſwer, it is more diſhonourable for us to deſert ourſelves, and to abandon every principle of

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our intereſt, liberty, or conſtitution. In what ſenſe can we be ſaid to deſert *him*, in putting an end to a war to which he never had, and never can have, the ſmalleſt relation? This, my Lord, is the plain ſtate of the caſe, and all the torrent of popular phrenzy never can over throw it. There is not a writer or ſpeaker in England, who has had the courage to review our late negotiation for peace, in a mild, calm, light. They who have defended our miniſter, think that he could not do leſs than reject it; they who blame him, think he did too much in the conceſſions he made.

My Lord, I am bold enough to ſay that had he ſtruck the bargain offered him by France, he would have done neither too much nor too little. And, however, he might have ſacrificed a fooliſh, immaterial, unmeaning punctilio or two, he would have ſtuck to the ſolid intereſt of this nation. Can any man, my Lord, of ſober ſenſe imagine, that his Britannic

majeſty

majeſty was in honour obliged to adopt the quarrel in which he never was engaged? Can the higheſt ſtrained vein of politics pretend that, even ſuppoſing we had ſettled our American diſputes with France, his Pruſſian majeſty would have had the ſmalleſt handle for complaining of a breach of the treaty ſubſiſting between them? The very preamble to that treaty implies, that it is for granting his Pruſſian majeſty ſpeedy and powerful aſſiſtance; but where; not ſurely in America? Our treaty with him had not the leaſt regard to our diſputes with France upon that continent. Had we conſulted the ſpirit of the treaty, we muſt have known, and ſo muſt the French have known to their coſt, that our finiſhing our American diſputes was the greateſt advantage that could have accrued to the king of Pruſſia; and, my Lord, I am ſorry to ſay, that I am afraid our not finiſhing them has ruined him.

Had our miniſter had nothing in his eye but a ſteady attachment to the honour and intereſt of his country, he could not have deliberated for one inſtant between the continuance of war, at the immenſe real expence we are now at, and the concluſion of peace at the imaginary expence of what can ſcarcely deſerve the name of a punctilio. It ſoon appeared that the duration of war was not ſufficient for his purpoſes, unleſs it was likewiſe extended; and we muſt grapple with Spain as well as with France. I ſhall not here recapitulate what I ſaid in my laſt, on the ſubject of a Spaniſh war; but I muſt be of opinion, that we enter at preſent into it, if we are about to enter into it, with infinite diſadvantages.

Spain, my Lord, has not for theſe hundred years paſt been near ſo powerful as ſhe is at preſent, if we conſider the three particulars that conſtitute national power, I mean her land army, her fleet, and her finances. It may be ſaid, and I ſhall not

diſpute

diſpute it, that our fleet is far ſuperior to hers; but we are to reflect that, conſidering our national debt, our means for ſupporting that fleet are far inferior; unleſs we have a mind to plunge ourſelves into a national bankruptcy. This muſt be the conſequence, ſhould we continue the war at the ſame expence we now are at, even ſuppoſing, what can by no means be admitted, that a war with Spain will not, while that with France continues, be attended with any additional expence. Had we, while freſh and faſting, as the ſaying is, entered into a Spaniſh war, and I can by no means ſee that the ſame reaſons for it, did not ſubſiſt then, as much as they do now, the caſe had been very different, and it is more than probable, that we might have made the Spaniards defray the expences of both wars. But he muſt be a novice in politics who does not know that Spain never makes a claim, that ſhe never gives a ſurly look, or a harſh anſwer, before the arrival of her treaſure

from America. Even the inſolent memorial which was ſo contemptuouſly, and, I think, juſtly returned by our miniſter to Monſ. Buſſy, who preſented it, did not provoke the court of Madrid into any indecent reſentment. Far from that, the Spaniſh miniſter at London cloaked all under the maſk of candor and ſincerity. The reaſon, my Lord, is plain, it was becauſe they had not then got home their plate-fleet and galleons from America. Had the caſe been otherwiſe with them, they would have ſpoken the very language that their ambaſſador the count de Fuentes ſpoke before he left England, in his famous memorial, an inſult ſo groſs to the crown of Great Britain, that nothing but its not being authentically contradicted, could induce me to believe it genuine.

But, my Lord, tho' moderation and decency are neceſſary obſervances amongſt great ſtates, yet I cannot help doing one piece of juſtice to our late miniſter, by acknow-

acknowledging that we ought to have begun to talk in a peremptory tone to the court of Madrid ſooner than we did. The reſtitution of the captures ſhe claimed was highly inſolent; becauſe the legality of them was to be determined by laws that are uncommon to all nations. His Britannic majeſty had it not in his power to comply with ſuch demands; becauſe, if the captures were legal, they were the property of his ſubjects. If they were illegal, they muſt be reſtored, in courſe, to the ſubjects of Spain, without the intervention of that court. The privilege claimed for the Spaniſh nation, for fiſhing upon the banks of Newfoundland, is ſo inſolent, that one can ſcarcely think it was made in earneſt. It is true, in the 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht, between Great Britain and Spain, mention is made that the Guipuſcoans pretend to certain rights of fiſhing at Newfoundland; and it is agreed that all ſuch privileges as they, and other

people of Spain are able to claim by right ſhall be allowed to them. But, my Lord, though I think this to be the moſt indefenſible article, in that or any other treaty, concluded at that time ; yet I think, at preſent, the meaning of is next to nothing, as it never was heard, that the Guipuſcoans, or any other people of Spain, had been able to make out this pretended unheard-of claim. It is true, that the liberty of fiſhing upon the banks of Newfoundland would be a very pretty perquiſite to Spain, becauſe it would furniſh out all the tables of that kingdom, for almoſt half the year ; but it is as true, a claim does not eſtabliſh a right ; and they might, with equal juſtice, have demanded the arſenal of the tower of London to be delivered up to them.

The next demand of the Spaniards, I mean that for demoliſhing the Engliſh ſettlements in the bay of Honduras, is equally unjuſt and unreaſonable ; unleſs

they

they can prove, what they never have attempted to do, the right of pre-occupancy to be in their favour; whereas, we have proved it, as far as the nature of the thing can admit of, to be in ours.

But, my Lord, all thoſe claims of the Spaniards are founded in the capital maxims of their monarchy, which we ought long ago to have diſputed and deſtroyed. It is true, we entered into the laſt war with them entirely upon the principle of our being exempted from all kinds of ſearch on the open ſeas; but we never have been able in expreſs terms to obtain from them an acknowledgement of that exemption. But, on a review of of treaties, have we no other demands upon Spain; and, why ought we not to enter our claims in return? The excluſive right of the Spaniards to the commerce with their own ſettlements in America is by the eighth article of the treaty of Utrecht eſtabliſhed by common conſent as a fundamental rule; the ſame article

provides

provides, " That no licence ſhall at any time be given to the French, or any other nations to introduce negroes, goods, merchandize, or any things whatſoever, into the Spaniſh American dominions." And, " It is futher agreed, that none of the Spaniſh dominions in America ſhall ever be alienated from the crown of Spain, to the French, or other nation." Have thoſe ſtipulations been obſerved by Spain, or rather has ſhe not groſly violated every one of them? Do not the French, at this very time, openly trade to her American colonies; and has ſhe not put them in actual poſſeſſion of one half of the iſland of St. Domingo, by which they have been enabled to inſult and diſtreſs the Britiſh navigation?

I ſhould be glad to know, why, during the courſe of this ruinous war with France, our late miniſter, who could with ſuch ſpirit reſent the delivery of a ſilly ridiculous paper, did not talk with the Spaniards concerning thoſe monſtrous violations

violations of treaties, in which this nation is ſo capitally intereſted? Far from that, we winked at them out of tenderneſs to Spain, and we even boggled at ſeizing French property, when bound either to or from St. Domingo. What is ſtill more extraordinary and incredible is, that, for many months paſt, there has not been a ſingle memorial preſented on our parts, complaining of thoſe infractions; ſo that, it is very poſſible, the court of Spain now conſtrues our acquieſcence into a right to themſelves. What conſtructions can be put upon ſuch an acquieſcence, ſo long continued with our eyes open, and ſo ſuddenly interrupted, but that our miniſter found it convenient for him to make that a pretext for retiring from a poſt he no longer could hold with ſafety? To pretend, in general terms, that Spain had already done things that were prejudicial to Great-Britain, was childiſh and nugatory. Why were not thoſe things ſpecified?

and, why did not our miniſter manfully ſay, "I cannot, I will not, hold a place in the government, ſo long as Spain keeps up pretenſions, and obſerves a conduct, inconſiſtent with the faith of treaties?" Five hundred detentions, my Lord, ſuch as that of the Antigallican privateer, and a thouſand Spaniards ſailing under French colours, were not of equal importance with the explicit clearing up a ſingle right that belongs to us by treaty. An apology for the forwardneſs of a governor; a check given to a captain, or commander; are looked upon amongſt nations as ſufficient atonements for temporary offences; and, if our gazette does not misinform us, ſuch atonements have been accepted of, and that too very lately. But, my Lord, we have, upon record in the Engliſh hiſtory, a precedent of one of the greateſt men this nation ever produced, having loſt his head upon a ſcaffold, for being guilty of what was conſtrued to be a violation of the treaties

ſubſiſting

ſubſiſting between England and Spain; I mean Sir Walter Raleigh. I am far from vindicating the manner of his death; but I will venture to ſay, that we never can have a ſolid or a firm peace with Spain, unleſs the principle upon which it was effected is purſued.

The law of nations conſiders the violator of a treaty in the ſame light as the Engliſh law does the violator of an act of parliament; and the maxims of ſound policy require that the one ſhould be as ſeverely puniſhed as the other. If any difference is made it ought to be in favour of the criminal who is guilty of a felony, which affects only one or two individuals, and not of the firebrands who ſet nations on flames. But, to conſtitute an offence, there muſt be a law; and he who trangreſſes no law cannot be deemed an offender. That treaties are laws, or ought to be laws, to the reſpective contracting parties, is without all manner of doubt; but, my Lord, in-

genuouſly and impartially ſpeaking, I know not of a ſingle treaty, now ſubſiſting between Spain and us, that the ſubjects of Spain think themſelves bound by, with regard to their and our American commerce, the capital point of conſequence between us. Can it be ſaid, that the article of *Uti Poſſidetis*, which is the third in the American treaty, is binding upon Spain, while ſhe inſiſts upon our abandoning our logwood ſettlements, which we were undeniably in poſſeſſion of before that treaty was concluded? Can it be pretended, that we have the ſmalleſt benefit from the article ſtipulating that we ſhall have a free navigation from one of our own colonies to another, while the court of Spain has never directly given up her claims of ſearching our ſhips, and confiſcating their cargoes, upon the American ſeas, which ſhe, in fact, pretends to be all within her dominions? What benefit can we reap by the ſtipulation that provides for the

excluſion

excluſion of the French, and other nations from trading with the Spaniſh ſettlements in America, while the Spaniards lay down as a principle, that they have a right to break through thoſe ſtipulations, and to give to the French there what indulgences they ſhall find proper? Has not both France and Spain of late avowed that Great-Britain has no right to interfere in any ſuch indulgences? Have not even the Dutch entered their claims to a free navigation and commerce with the Spaniſh and French Weſt-Indies, provided they can obtain licences from the courts of Madrid and Verſailles for that purpoſe?

Theſe are points, my Lord, of too ſerious, too national, a concern, to be blended with the caſe of any miniſter, not even of the great one who lately reſigned the ſeals of his office. They ought to ſtand on the footing of their own importance, and on that only. Let us, therefore, ſuppoſe all miniſterial con-

ſiderations to be out of the queſtion. But, how is Great Britain then to proceed ? My Lord, if it could have been done with honour, and conſiſtently with her own ſafety, ſhe ought to have avoided going to war with Spain ; but, as ſhe is driven to that diſagreeable neceſſity, ſhe ought never to put up the ſword, till ſhe obliges Spain to a peace, which may prevent her from ever being under the neceſſity of again drawing it, on account of her commerce, which is the only account that can create any difference between the two nations. Since I took the pen in my hand, a war with Spain has been declared ; but that declaration does not in the ſmalleſt degree operate towards my altering what I have had the honour to lay before your lordſhip. It rather impels the expediency both of blaming and bewailing the conduct, that rendered ſuch a war a neceſſary meaſure on the part of Great-Britain, at ſo critical a time. Had they, whom

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the right honourable gentleman differed with, been as laviſh of their appeals to the world, or as forward in publiſhing them; or had they thought that ſuch appeals were conſiſtent with their ſervices, as privy-counſellors to his majeſty, and the nation, a very different ſcene, long before this time, would have been exhibited. The juncture, or to uſe the modern term, the epoch is now elapſed, that rendered ſuch a ſilence expedient in point of decency, and neceſſary in point of duty. It would then have appeared that ſuch of his majeſty's ſervants, as have been branded for their tameneſs, I will not ſay by whom; (for I cannot yet prevail with myſelf to believe the right honourable gentleman to be the author of the letter publiſhed under his name,) becauſe they differed in opinion from him and his brother, did not do it from any over cautious diſpoſitions they wanted to entertain towards Spain, but as to the manner in which thoſe diſpoſitions

were

were to be expreſſed. There was not at that board a member, and I appeal to your lordſhip for the truth of what I ſay, who diſcovered the ſmalleſt heſitation as to declaring war, if the Spaniards ſhould inſiſt upon their iniquitous demands. It was agreed by all, that thoſe demands gave too propable an appearance of the exiſtence of a treaty to our prejudice between France and Spain. That the diſclaiming thoſe terms was the ſtrongeſt proof that ſuch a treaty did not exiſt; and that their giving an equivocal anſwer to a formal demand made by our miniſter, as to the reality of that treaty, was the ſureſt evidence of their intending not only to inſiſt upon their demands, but to hurt us in our moſt important concerns ; and if ſuch was the caſe, it was unanimouſly agreed not to defer the declaration a ſingle moment.

The difference therefore, my Lord, was, whether by our proceeding regularly, we ſhould proceed the leſs rapidly ?

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whether our conduct ſhould be firm or flaſhy? whether we ſhould deprive Spain of all pretences, as we now have done, of appealing to the reſt of the powers of Europe, and of charging us with piracy, and breach of faith; or leave her at liberty to make hers the common cauſe of everycivilized nation, I had almoſt ſaid of humanity itſelf?

A war, a momentous war, is not to be conducted as ſome towns, my Lord, are taken, by a coup de main. The laws of nations have eſtabliſhed regular approaches, and the more regular they are made, the ſucceſs has always been found the greater. Moderation is no enemy to vigour, and *ſuaviter in modo, fortiter in re*, has always been an approved maxim, not only by the ableſt ſtateſmen, but the greateſt generals. I do not mean by this, to inſinuate that we were to dally with the Spaniards; but I think we are right in rendering their conduct inexcuſable. The people of Great Britain, my Lord,

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think more for themſelves than any people in the word, perhaps, than all the people in the world do; and they have a better right to do ſo, becauſe they pay dearer than any other people ever did, for that ineſtimable privilege. Our public treaties with Spain give no countenance to a coup de main war, and what muſt our public have thought, had the government not only plunged them into ſuch a war, but had neglected every previous meaſure that eſtabliſhes the difference between warrantable hoſtilities and illegal piracies? Had ſuch a war been entered into, and, as nothing is impoſſible in war, had its commencement been unſucceſsful on our part, would the right honourable gentleman and his brother have ſtepped forth and ſaid to the people and parliament of Great Britain, "We alone are to blame, our credit carried at the C——l B——d the manner of making this war, in oppoſition to the ſentiments of his majeſty, and the ſenſe of his miniſtry?"

ſtry? I ſay, my Lord, is it conſiſtent with common ſenſe, to ſuppoſe that they would have made ſuch a declaration? On the other hand, what a pitiful figure muſt the reſt of his majeſty's ſervants have made in vindicating themſelves; if all they could alledge in their own defence was, that fifty or ſixty of them were over-ruled by two of their own number? And yet had they not made that defence, the indignation, and perhaps the vengeance, of the public muſt have fallen equally on the whole board, as was in a great meaſure the caſe with thoſe who acquieſced in the partition-treaty, and thoſe who went with the majority, even of parliament, in that of Utrecht.

But, my Lord, how did the caſe actually ſtand between the right honourable gentleman and his opponents? He had guided the affairs of the nation near ſix years. Was his quarrel with Spain a ſudden eruption, like thoſe of Ætna or Veſuvius? Was it but of yeſterday's ſtanding? Then, undoubtedly, there was the

more reaſon for caution and regularity on our part; becauſe, whatever we may imagine, a rupture with Spain is not ſo deſirable an event at preſent, as the right honourable gentleman and the commonality of England repreſent it. If, as I believe really was the caſe, Spain has been hoarding up her wrath, and laying up her materials for war, during all the time of the right honourable gentleman's adminiſtration? why did he not, four years ago, take the reſolution that he has put in practice within theſe four months? It is no ſecret to the public, that the nature of his department, in the adminiſtration, made him the only miniſter who was in poſſeſſion of all the ſecrets of our affairs with Spain. What adds to the misfortune of the public is, that no council under that of the great council of the nation, had a right, without his majeſty's order, to demand thoſe ſecrets from him. Therefore, tho' a ſecretary of ſtate, if like the right honourable gentleman, he is a firſt miniſter, after he lays an event, a

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tranſaction, or a meaſure before the C—l B—d, has no more vote than any other member there, as to the deciſion, yet he has it in his own breaſt, without an abſolute command from his majeſty, whether he ſhall, or ſhall not, ſubmit the matter to their judgment. And this, my Lord, brings me to a period very ſimilar to the preſent.

Four and twenty years ago we had a firſt miniſter, who, though no ſecretary of ſtate, poſſeſſed an abſolute and uncontroulable power in the government. This firſt miniſter's plan of government, my Lord, was as pacific as that of his ſucceſſor was warlike, and yet both purſued their ends in the ſame manner. Sir R. W. correſponded perſonally with our ambaſſador at Spain, who, to our misfortune, was a very weak miniſter, and kept not only the parliament, but the council board, in the dark, as to all the ſhocking things the Spaniards were carrying on to our prejudice, becauſe he knew if they were known here, he could not prevent

a war. My Lord, I ſhould be ſorry if any of his ſucceſſors in miniſterial power, have rendered our tranſactions with Spain equally impenetrable, in order to prevent a peace. It happened, however, that Geraldino, the Spaniſh miniſter here, took all opportunities of declaring that Sir R. W. was impoſing upon the public, and that his maſter had no ſuch pacific intentions. The nation believed Geraldino ſooner than they did Sir R. W. and at laſt he was driven into a war, by which he loſt his poſt and his power, but gained a penſion, and a title in his family.

Tho', for very different purpoſes, the like conduct ſeems lately to have been purſued, I will venture to ſay, neither the public, nor the parliament, nor even the reſt of the king's ſervants, till the evil was paſt remedy, received that information concerning our differences with Spain, as could enlighten and enable them to proceed in a path, which might have led to the end of thoſe differences; which was far from being impracticable,

had

had the matter been taken up in time. The cry of No ſearch, which the nation adopted at the beginning of the laſt war with Spain, was a ſtrong ſtubborn principle, and obſtinately diſputed on both ſides; and yet, though the Spaniards never could be brought formally and ſincerely to give up the point, it has ſcarcely ever been mentioned ſince the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The demand of ſatisfaction for captures of Spaniſh ſhips is childiſh and trifling, becauſe it is well known, that it does not depend upon his majeſty or our court; for, if ſuch ſatisfaction is due, it muſt be obtained in a legal regular method, which is open to the Spaniards, as well as all the other nations of Europe. The very mention of their demand for liberty to fiſh on the banks of Newfoundland is ridiculous, and proves them not to have been ſincere in making it. The diſpute about the logwood trade has ſubſiſted theſe two hundred years; and, though I am far from ſaying, that a Britiſh miniſter

niſter could give up our rights in the bay of Honduras, yet I cannot think it ought to have been beneath the attention of any miniſter to have entered upon a negotiation for regulating that trade.

Now, my Lord, I muſt be free enough to ſay, that I think two periods exiſted, during the right honourable gentleman's adminiſtration, of very different natures. The firſt was, *when they would, and we would not*. The ſecond, *when we would, and they would not*. They would have compromiſed all differences with us, before his catholic majeſty's acceſſion to that crown, when his predeceſſor and his miniſtry were well inclined to England; when the ill ſtate of their king's health enfeebled their government; when we were fifty millions leſs in debt than we are at preſent; when the affairs of our great ally on the continent wore a promiſing aſpect; and when our ſucceſſes muſt have daunted any other nation from embracing their cauſe, or abetting their injuſtice.

It is plain the alteration of the ſituations has altered their conduct; they, and all Europe, believe that if England ſhould continue the war for a few years, ſhe muſt run into an inevitable national bankruptcy. They are convinced, at the ſame time, that his Pruſſian majeſty, in the vineyard of whoſe cauſe we have ſo faithfully laboured, totters on the brink of perdition. They know that France, far from being in the deſperate ſtate that ſhe has been repreſented in, by the right honourable gentleman and his friends, is through the plenty of the ſeaſons, and the loyalty of her ſubjects, who are more diſguſted with the haughtineſs of our miniſter's perſonal behaviour than with the ſteadineſs of his political conduct, is at this very time, in a better condition to continue the war, than ſhe has been any time within theſe two years paſt. Spain has a formidable army, and a reſpectable navy. Though France did undoubtedly make a moſt unnatural conjunction with the court of Vienna, yet

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ſhe has gained one great point by it, which is, that by introducing the Ruſſians into the empire, ſhe has obtained a powerful check upon the court of Vienna and the Germanic empire, if ſhe ſhould again break with the houſe of Auſtria, an event, which is perhaps not ſo diſtant as ſome may imagine ; for it muſt take place the moment the king of Pruſſia is ſtript of Sileſia. I could perhaps mention ſome matters of a more domeſtic concern, which would heighten this picture.

Our commercial concerns with Portugal, next to thoſe with our own colonies, are undoubtedly the moſt conſiderable we have. In what a condition, my Lord, muſt they be, if that prince ſhould have no alternative but that of oppoſing in the field an army of 30,000 Spaniards, or taking ſhelter under the cannon of our ſhips. It is certain, that his frontiers are unprovided for reſiſtance ; that he has not in all Portugal 15,000 troops ; that the affection of his ſubjects, through the

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ſeverity, if not barbarity, of his miniſters, are moſt miſerably alienated from his government; and that Spain has a powerful party in the very heart of his capital.

Such being the caſe, what a comfortable proſpect have we on that ſide, when inſtead of receiving from Portugal a million yearly on the balance of our trade, we may expect that trade to be in the hands of our enemies, and England once more giving refuge to an exiled king of Portugal? It is true, that during the late war, the crown of Portugal remained neutral, and our trade to it ſtill continued; but what, my Lord, was that owing to, but to the ambition of the queen-mother of Spain, who no longer governs there? The Italian war; by which ſhe obtained a kingdom for one of her ſons, and a dutchy for another, and during the continuance of that war, from firſt to laſt, it coſt Spain above 150,000 lives, beſides moſt immenſe treaſures. But to cloſe this uncomfortable proſpect, we are to remember that it is poſſible, at this very time,

the iſland of Minorca, which gave us ſuch deciſive advantages in our differences with that crown, is again in the hands of the Spaniards.

Now, my Lord, though I am far from inſinuating that thoſe are conſiderations which ought to operate at preſent, yet they ought certainly to have operated before matters were reduced to extremities; in which caſe we could eaſily have cooled the courage of our new enemies. To mention but one particular; why were not the grievances we ſuffered from Spain, and which are mentioned by the right honourable gentleman, in his famous letter, as the cauſe of his reſignation, becauſe they were not reſented, laid before the parliament and the public, that we might have obtained a categorical anſwer before the arrival of her treaſures from America? I believe it would puzzle the right honourable gentleman and his friends, to give a tolerable reaſon for this omiſſion. I know they ſay, that the reaſon why Mr. P. reſigned is juſtified by our declaring

ing war with Spain; but that is saying nothing at all, unleſs he can prove that he again and again endeavoured to make his late and his preſent majeſty, their parliament, and their council, ſenſible that a war with Spain, was inevitable, unleſs we could reduce her to juſtice and moderation. It is evident, that till within at moſt two months before the right honourable gentleman's reſignation, the neceſſity of a rupture with Spain never was dreamed of, by the people or parliament of England, or, I believe known to any Britiſh ſubject, but the right honourable gentleman himſelf.

The next conſideration, my Lord, that muſt affect a Britiſh ſubject, upon the approaching rupture, is the caſe of the Dutch. Their barrier may be ſaid to be now no more. Little of her marine power remains; and if France, aſſiſted by Spain, ſhould demand their abandoning their neutrality, what can they do? I know what they ought to do, and what perhaps would be the wiſeſt thing they could do;

to join themſelves to Great Britain with ſpirit and vigour. But have we any reaſon to believe from the temper and diſpoſitions of the preſent governing party in Holland, that that will be the caſe ? I am afraid not. I am far from being under any great alarms as to the prejudice, which the power of Holland by ſea and land, could do us, even if ſhe ſhould declare againſt us. But what muſt be the conſequence to our public credit, upon which, I may ſay the exiſtence of this nation depends ? Could it ſupport the Dutch withdrawing from it, all that they have in our funds? Could it withſtand the ſhock it muſt receive from the ſtagnation of all commercial intercourſe between the ſubjects of Great-Britain and Holland.

In ſhort, my Lord, I am one of the very few, who think that the Dutch being forced to declare againſt us, would, tho' they never ſhould ſtrike a ſtroke, be the moſt fatal event that could happen to this kingdom, the French having ſo eaſy an acceſs as they have to their coun-

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try. It is therefore, my Lord, natural to enquire, whether the right honourable gentleman, during his adminiſtration, had it in his power to have finiſhed one war for us before we were plunged into another. It is certain that the count de Fuentes, during the negotiation, aſſerted that he had. In the note delivered by him to Mr. P. No. 24, of the Hiſtorical Memorial, he ſays, that, "His Catholic majeſty will always be pleaſed, whenever he ſees that they make that progreſs, which he has ever deſired, in the negotiation of peace? whether it be ſeparate between France and England, or general; as his ſincere wiſhes are to make it perpetual, by obviating every ſource which might hereafter, unhappily, renew the war." In the memorial the ſame miniſter left behind him, when he left England, he is ſtill more explicit; for he there ſays, that, "His Catholic majeſty wrote to his couſin, the moſt Chriſtian king, that ſince the junction of the affairs of Spain obſtructed in England the intended

tended peace, he would rather abandon the ſame, than lay the leaſt obſtacle thereto."

Now, my Lord, ſuppoſing thoſe facts to be true, and they have never yet been contradicted, was it worth our while, for the ſake of thoſe few unimportant points, or rather punctilios, that broke off the treaty between us and France, not only to continue our war with her, but to enter into a new one with Spain, who comes, as we may ſay, freſh and faſting, into the field; *nitidus atque inunctus in arenam deſcendit*. France, my Lord, can do a great deal with Spain. Spain can do very little without France.

It may be ſaid, that ſuppoſing we had made a peace with France, the Spaniſh claims ſtill lay over our heads, and that they were ſtill unrelinquiſhed by her. There let them lie; ſo long as ſhe was detached from France, we had nothing to fear from them. But I foreſee, I may be called upon, to reconcile the doctrine I have here laid down, of the firſt letter I had the honour to addreſs to your lordſhip,

ſhip, with what I have ſaid above. I have there (page 57, *et ſeq.*) ſaid, "that the Spaniards, in a war with England, had every thing to fear, and nothing to hope for; and that England could maintain a war againſt both the crowns, with as little expence as ſhe is at with one." My Lord, I am ſtill of that opinion, if we ſimply conſider the operations of the war; but the conſequences of it give it a very different complexion.

I am proud, my Lord, before I cloſe this letter, to reflect that I have the honour of being countenanced in all its contents, by no leſs than royal authority. His majeſty's declaration of war againſt Spain, confirms every word I have advanced, with regard to the merits of the right honourable gentleman, in abdicating his poſt; becauſe we did not proceed in a manner that is thought barbarous amongſt barbarians. A word and a blow is the deſcription of impatient reſentment; but his impatience was ſuch, that the word was to be omitted, and the

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blow to take place; a conduct which his majesty tells us, he was bound in justice and prudence to forbear, especially as the profound dissimulation of the Spanish court, and the declarations of their ministers, presented no handle for coming to extremities. As matters have turned out, Spain, in fact, is the party who has first declared war, upon the false and foolish pretence that war was declared by the fair and friendly application of our ministers, to know the truth of a prevailing report. The right honourable gentleman's friends may now set their wits to work, in comparing his conduct with that of his majesty, and the rest of the council. Let them prove that a single moment has been lost, except that which was due to those forms that are so indispensible amongst nations, that they are thought to be indispensible to justice.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient

humble Servant.

FINIS.